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Consequentialist views have traditionally taken a maximizing
form, requiring agents to bring about the very best outcome
that they can. But this maximizing function may be ques-
tioned. Satiscing views instead allow agents to bring about
any outcome that exceeds a satisfactory threshold or qualies
as “good enough.” Scalar consequentialism, by contrast, es-
chews moral requirements altogether, instead evaluating acts
in purely comparative terms, i.e., as better or worse than their
alternatives. After surveying the main considerations for and
against each of these three views, I argue that the core insights
of each are not (despite appearances) in conict. Consequen-
tialists should be deontic pluralists and accept a maximizing
account of the ought of most reason, a satiscing account of
obligation, and a scalar account of the weight of reasons.
Introduction
Consequentialism directs us to promote the good. But howmuch?
Is there a “right amount” of good to produce—a level we need
*Forthcoming in D. Portmore (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism
(OUP). Thanks to Sarah Buss, Anna Edmonds, Emma Hardy, Hrishikesh Joshi,
Douglas Portmore, Peter Singer, Michael Slote, and Helen Yetter-Chappell for
helpful discussion and comments.
1
to reach in order to qualify as acting rightly? Maximizers hold
the right amount to be the maximum available to the agent in
the circumstances: you act wrongly if an alternative option would
have brought about a better outcome. Satiscers identify a less
strict threshold, allowing that some suboptimal acts may nonethe-
less be “good enough”. Finally, scalar consequentialists reject the
question, simply arming that acts are better the more good that
they produce.
In this paper, I’ll question an assumption that underlies this
whole debate: that there is a single sense of “rightness” about which
these various forms of consequentialism disagree. Sec. 1 discusses
maximizing consequentialism, with particular attention to the
demandingness objection and to broader structural concerns with
identifying rightness and optimality. Sec. 2 explores the case for
scalar consequentialism, but then suggests two senses of “rightness”
that the scalar theorist lacks good grounds for dismissing. Sec. 3
makes the case for satiscing consequentialism, showing how the
view can be defended against three important objections. Finally,
sec. 4 explains how deontic pluralism enables us to reconcile these
three forms of consequentialism. We can accept an attractive
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package view that is scalar at core, maximizing about the ought of
most reason, and satiscing about obligation.
1 Maximizing
Maximizing Act Consequentialists hold that an act is right if and
only if it produces at least as much value as any other act that
the agent could perform at that time. A maximizing approach to
ethics can be motivated by appeal to our inclination towards max-
imizing accounts of practical rationality more generally (Scheer
1985). Once appropriate practical goals have been identied, it
would seem instrumentally rational to act so as to best achieve the
relevant goals.1
There’s no question that from a consequentialist perspective, a
suboptimal act is worse than an optimal alternative. So, inasmuch
as asking after “the right act” in a situation builds in a linguistic
presumption of uniqueness—that there is just one choice among
1Michael Slote has suggested to me a need to distinguish “maximizing” from
“optimizing”, as one who gives weight to distributional considerations might
judge the optimal distribution to be one that does not maximize the amount
of good being distributed. However, once we recognize that the egalitarian
consequentialist takes equality itself to be of value, we can see that maximizing
the amount of some resource without regard for distribution is not necessarily the
same as maximizing the value of the overall state of aairs. It is the latter that I
take the maximizing consequentialist to be committed to. “Maximizing” in this
sense is perfectly compatible with egalitarian or other distributional concerns.
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the agent’s options which is the right one—a maximizing account
of right action can come to seem very natural to a consequentialist.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to bewary of insisting that conse-
quentialism take a maximizing form. Despite sometimes speaking
of “the right act”, we don’t generally think that morality is so re-
strictive as to rule out almost every option we have in any given
situation. We expect morality to rule out morally unacceptable
options, and leave us free to choose amongst the remainder—
including, typically, many options that are considered acceptable
despite falling short of moral perfection. Maximizers, by con-
trast, are committed to denying any space for such moral autonomy
(though they can certainly defend the social practice of autonomy,
given that trying to force people to act maximally well would plau-
sibly backre). We may choose how to break ties between morally
optimal options, if there happens to be more than one, but are
given no further permissible options beyond that.
By so restricting our practically permissible options, maximiz-
ing consequentialism also proves conceptually restricting. For, in
eshing out the structure of our moral options, common sense
recognizes conceptual room for the supererogatory, i.e., acts that
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go “above and beyond” the call of duty. This possibility is entirely
precluded by a maximizing account of our duties. If required to
always do the best, there is no room left for us to do better than
the minimum required.
Further, by requiring actions that are intuitively supereroga-
tory, maximizers are subject to the objection that their conception
of morality is overly demanding, or places unreasonable demands
on agents. This objection is standardly developed in relation to the
demands of benecence, and especially Singer (1972)’s view that
we should give to the point of marginal utility—where any further
donation would hurt us more than it would help the recipients.
How weighty should consequentialists nd the demanding-
ness objection? Norcross (2019, chap. 2.2) questions the reliability
of anti-demandingness intuitions on the grounds of their being
obviously self-serving for the culturally inuential. Sobel (2007)
counters it dierently, arguing that the demandingness objection
presupposes, rather than supports, non-consequentialist asymme-
tries between (e.g.) action and inaction. After all, however demand-
ing maximizing consequentialism may seem for the auent, we
may wonder why alternative theories are not seen as even more
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demanding for the poor, given the much greater costs that will
befall them if the auent fail to give much aid (Murphy 2000, 55).
Ordinary demandingness intuitions are evidently not tracking a
neutral evaluation of the (net) costs to people of general compli-
ance with a theory. This may support Norcross’ suspicions, and
lead us to doubt whether we have principled reasons to care about
whatever it is that they are tracking.
Defenders of the demandingness objection respond by stress-
ing the signicance of self-imposed costs as raising distinctivemoral
questions. We may ask whether agents have sucient reason to
complywith a putativemoral demand that would prove very costly
to them (Woollard 2016), or whether they would warrant blame
should they fail to so comply (McElwee 2017). Such questions
aren’t applicable to moral patients when they suer costs imposed
from without. Morality does not, in this instance, demand that the
suerers do anything. And so the distinctive questions of moral
demandingness simply don’t arise in relation to such costs.
This account allows us tomake sense of the special role that self-
imposed costs play in our assessments of demandingness. But it
remains an open question whether we have good grounds to trust
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the underlying intuitions that would permit the auent to neglect
the needs of the poor. The critics of maximization may thus
do better to shift their focus away from the specic demands of
benecence, and instead emphasize the purely structural objections
to maximizing consequentialism.
As Railton (1988, 407) notes, “it seems inconsistent with any-
thing like our ordinary understanding of ‘morally right’ to say that
the boundary separating the right from the wrong is to be sharply
drawn innitesimally below the very best action possible. [. . . ]
‘Wrong’ comes into clear application only when we reach actions
far enough below normal expectations to warrant real criticism or
censure.” McElwee (2017, 97) similarly observes that “we do not
judge that someone warrants feelings of blame and guilt simply
for acting morally suboptimally.” It’s one thing to hold that ex-
treme poverty and suering are morally intolerable, and so can
generate extreme demands. It’s quite another to insist upon the
intolerability of suboptimality per se. Imagine getting worked up
over a lost penny in Utopia. The view begins to sound literally
insane.
Maximization may also face embarrassment when confronted
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with its structural analogy to theminimalist view onwhich only the
very worst option (among all available) is held to bewrong (cf. Slote
1985, 77). Although less silly-seeming than this opposite extreme,
maximizationmay start to seem less like a well-motivated “default”
form for consequentialism to take, and more like a hasty graft of
consequentialist ideas upon an incompatible (or at least ill-tting)
base of deontic concepts. For while consequentialists may all agree
that a value-maximizing option is best, or what we’ve most moral
reason to choose, it’s entirely obscure what further claim (if any)
the maximizer means to make by insisting that the best option is
also obligatory.2
2 Scalar Consequentialism
Suspicions regarding the traditional deontic concepts may nat-
urally lead consequentialists to jettison them in favor of simply
evaluating actions on a scale from better to worse. Howard-Snyder
(1994, 110) identies the heart of consequentialism as the claim
that, “The better a state of aairs, the more moral reason an agent
2Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014, 334), for example, explicitly take the question
“what ought I to do?” to be equivalent to “What do I have most reason to do?”
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has to produce it.” There’s no obvious motivation internal to con-
sequentialism for drawing a line between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ at
any particular point on the scale. Whether maximal, minimal, or
something in between, the placement of such a line on the scale
from best to worst action may seem unacceptably arbitrary. This
arbitrariness worry motivated the original development of scalar
consequentialism in Slote (1985, chap. 5), and also features in the
most recent development of the view by Norcross (2019, chap. 2.3,
drawing from his 2006). And it is a fair worry as far as it goes. But
I think it actually stems from a deeper problem, namely, a lack
of clarity regarding what (for consequentialists) any such line is
supposed to even signify.3 Once we are clearer on what the line
between right and wrong is meant to signify, we may nd that the
question of where to draw it is more easily answered.
Norcross assumes that deontic binaries would create extra rea-
sons, in a way that’s incompatible with consequentialism. Conse-
3Anscombe (1958) famously raised similar worries, albeit in a dierent dialec-
tical context, about the intelligibility of traditional deontic concepts in modern
moral philosophy. Railton (1988, 408) suggests that act utilitarians use ‘right’
as a term of art, which strikes me as robbing their claims about rightness of
any substance. Howard-Snyder (1994, 121) aptly observes, “Once you see the
consequentialist as saying that there is more moral reason to produce A than B
it is hard to see what else she could be saying when she says that the agent ought
to or is required to produce A.”
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quentialists should certainly prefer that Joe give an extra $500 to
eective charities rather than Jane giving an extra $499, regardless
of whether Jane’s increment would bump her over the line from
‘wrong’ to ‘right’. But this is just to observe that consequentialists
care exclusively about promoting value, and so have no indepen-
dent concern for the deontic status of an action (Lawlor 2009,
104). We can’t conclude from this that actions don’t have deontic
statuses, since making an evaluative dierence is not, in general,
a precondition for being a real property.4 Nonetheless, we may
at least wonder, with Norcross, what the signicance of an act’s
deontic status (as right or wrong) is supposed to consist in if it
makes no essential dierence to what others should do or prefer.
Here I think there are at least two possible answers worth con-
sidering. First, if we accept a distinction between moral and non-
moral (e.g. prudential) reasons, we might take an act’s deontic
status to reect how these reasons balance out. Along these lines,
Lawlor (2009, 106) suggests that benecent acts might be morally
required by a cost-sensitive form of consequentialism just when
4Wemight also question whether a third party’s attitudes are the right place
to look for moral signicance here (Lang 2013, 86). The deontic status of Jane’s
action may have some signicance for Jane even if it is not of interest to others,
after all.
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the moral reasons to do the act outweigh the agent’s (dispropor-
tionately weighted) prudential reasons against. On this view, while
some altruistic sacrice may be required of us, there is some point
at which the personal sacrice becomes suciently great that our
prudential reasons to favor ourselves trump our moral reasons to
promote the impartial good. Portmore (2011, chap. 5) further de-
velops such a dual-ranking structure for act consequentialists. On
such accounts, the line between right and wrong marks something
signicant about the agent’s overall reasons, without creating extra
reasons or otherwise conicting with core consequentialist tenets.
Alternatively, rather than treating an act’s deontic status as a
function of the agent’s various reasons for action, we might take it
to reect what reactive attitudes are warranted by the agent’s so act-
ing (McElwee 2010a). I think it is especially natural to understand
talk of “obligation” in this way. Thus, for example, Jane’s right-
making increment could simply have signicance for whether she
warrants certain negative reactive attitudes, without that giving
her any more reason than Joe has to act.
A potential advantage of this approach over dual-ranking is
that we aren’t committed to distinguishing distinctively moral
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from non-moral reasons, or to giving disproportionate weight to
an agent’s partial interests. A further advantage to understanding
obligation in terms of reactive attitudes will emerge in sec. 3.3.
(One could also opt to combine dual-ranking with the reactive-
attitudes account of obligation, so while I discuss them separately, I
do not mean to suggest that they are strictly exclusive alternatives.)
Of course, as Norcross (2019, chap. 2.4.) notes, consequential-
ists shouldn’t understand wrongness in terms of whether others
ought to punish or express blame towards the agent, as such acts
are themselves open to consequentialist assessment, which may
diverge radically from our assessment of the original action. Con-
ceivably, it could even be useful in some circumstances to express
blame towards someone for acting optimally (perhaps a trickster
demon would reward us for behaving so perversely). So the use-
fulness of expressing blame is just clearly irrelevant to any fair
normative assessment of the original action. But this doesn’t un-
dermine an analysis of wrongness in terms of blame-worthiness,
for whether it is useful to express blame is a completely separate
matter from whether blame (understood as a negative reactive
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attitude) is warranted,5 in much the same way that whether it is
useful to express fear in some situation is a completely separate
matter from whether fear is warranted.
Consequentialists have historically been loathe to acknowl-
edge any such independent norms of ttingness for our reactive
attitudes, but it’s not clear that this traditional aversion is well-
motivated. We wouldn’t normally think of consequentialism as be-
ing in conict with an epistemologist’s claims about our (evidential)
reasons for belief, after all. Insofar as there are belief-related ac-
tions we can take (e.g. brainwashing ourselves into acquiring a new
belief, or verbally expressing some existing belief), consequential-
ist assessment of those actions is perfectly possible. Nonetheless,
whether a belief is rationally warranted, or supported by the evi-
dence, is just a completely separate question from whether it is, in
practical terms, worth either inculcating or expressing. But now
notice that the same is true of emotions and reactive attitudes. A
plausible non-consequentialist account of when these states are
rationally warranted or tting can comfortably exist alongside
consequentialist norms for action (Chappell 2012).6 It may then
5McElwee (2010b, 399) has also emphasized this point in response to Norcross.
6We can (of course) evaluate these states, like anything else, in terms of their
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turn out that we sometimes ought to acquire irrational attitudes,
but such “rational irrationality” is a familiar possibility since Part
(1984, chap. 1). So I see no fundamental barrier to consequen-
tialists accepting an independent account of blameworthiness.7
Such an account could in turn ground an account of wrongness
that is (contra Norcross) signicant without creating extra deontic
reasons.
Our discussion so far suggests that the case for (or against) scalar
consequentialism really depends upon the larger question of what
sense consequentialists can give to a division between right and
contributory value: whether their existence makes the overall state of aairs
better or worse, and to what extent. Consequentialists will typically regard this
question of value as more important than assessments of rational warrant (we
should, for example, prefer that people have useful attitudes than that they have
warranted ones). Still, theoretical clarity requires us to recognize the two distinct
dimensions of normative assessment here. Consequentialists will hold that the
two dimensions coincide in the case of actions: the more useful or worthwhile
the act, the more objectively warranted it is to perform. (That’s what I mean
by “consequentialist norms for action”: accounting for our normative reasons
for action in terms of the value or desirability of so acting.) When assessing
mental states, by contrast, we should recognize that the two may come apart.
This is because whether a propositional attitude is warranted depends upon
whether its propositional content or object is tting to the type of attitude that
it is, which is clearly dierent from simply evaluating the consequences of
possessing the attitude in question. Note that acts don’t allow for any such clear-
cut distinction between “state” and “object”, which may partly explain why it’s
so much more natural to think that acts are warranted insofar as they produce
desirable outcomes.
7Independent of the consequences of possessing the blaming attitude, that
is. There will still be important connections between our normative theory and
our account of blameworthiness. Even supposing that blameworthiness is to be
accounted for in terms of quality of will, consequentialists are likely to dier
from others in how we interpret this. We may judge some benecent acts of
utilitarian sacrice—e.g., killing one to save ve in the notorious Trolley Bridge
case—to be well-motivated, when a deontologist would disagree.
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wrong actions. That’s the conclusion that I, at least, am drawn
towards. Some, however, have suggested rejecting scalar conse-
quentialism on the independent basis that it fails to be suciently
action-guiding.
2.1 Practical Guidance
In his original presentation of the idea of scalar morality, Slote
(1985, chap. 5.3) raised the worry that by failing to specify which
actions are right or wrong, such a view might seem to leave out
something essential to a full account of morality. Against this,
Slote notes that even non-scalar accounts don’t settle all practical
questions in circumstances where they give us multiple permissi-
ble options. Moreover, Slote suggests, a highly morally motivated
agent (who always prefers morally better options over morally
worse ones) could nd plenty of guidance in the comparative ver-
dicts yielded by scalar morality. It may be true that someone
specically motivated to do the least that morality requires of him
could no longer be guided by this specic desire. But if this is
really the only moral motivation that the agent has, we may be
more inclined to judge that the problem here lies with the agent
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rather than with scalar moral theories.
An alternative response available to the scalar theorist would
be to oer a scalar account of right(er) and wrong(er). Sinhababu
(2018) suggests that scalar morality can actually oer richer guid-
ance than traditional approaches, as it no longer lumps together
(e.g.) mildly bad and truly atrocious options as “equally wrong”.
While insisting that there is no fundamental signicance to the divid-
ing point between right and wrong actions, Sinhababu—following
Norcross (2005)—oers a contextualist account of rightness as
what’s better than some salient alternative or amount of goodness.
This allows the scalar consequentialist to engage in “rightness”-talk,
but in a way that makes the line drawn between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
merely conventional.
I nd it a bit unclear what is achieved by this maneuver. Be-
cause this constructed boundary between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ lacks
normative signicance, it would seem a mistake for agents to care
about it. Insofar as we want ne-grained guidance, this may be
found in the scalar theorist’s evaluations of options as better or
worse (to greater or lesser degrees). Repeating these judgments
using deontic vocabulary doesn’t seem to add anything. So, rather
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than oering guidance via scalar ‘rightness’, scalar theorists might
do better to simply insist that agents’ moral motivation should be
responsive to the scalar evaluative dierences upon which their
theory rests.
Insofar as we feel that something important is left out of the
scalar account, a merely conventional reconstruction of deontic
language seems unlikely to help. For what those dissatised by the
scalar approach really want, presumably, is for our moral theory
to identify a principled line of minimal decency below which we
must not fall (on pain of warranting negative reactive attitudes,
perhaps). For that, wemust move beyond the resources of a purely
scalar account of morality.
3 Satiscing
Slote (1984, 140) introduced philosophers to the idea of satisc-
ing consequentialism: “that an act might qualify as morally right
through having good enough consequences, even though better
consequences could have been produced in the circumstances.”8
8Though the broader concept of satiscing rst emerged in the economics
literature (Simon 1955).
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That is, rather than insisting that the best outcome be produced,
the satiscer identies a (non-maximal) value threshold at which
outcomes qualify as “good enough”. They then arm that any
act is permissible so long as it brings about some such suciently
good outcome. Only outcomes below this value threshold are
impermissible to produce.
Slote’s own version of the view is quite radical, licensing what
Pettit (1984, 172) calls “unmotivated submaximization”: picking a
worse option when a better one has been identied and is available
at no greater cost. This gives rise to one of the three central objec-
tions to satiscing consequentialism: the problem of gratuitous
suboptimality.
3.1 Gratuitious suboptimality
Mulgan (1993, 125) invites us to imagine that, faced with the option
to magically save any number of people from poverty, Achilles
deliberately chooses a number that is smaller than the total num-
ber of impoverished people, insisting that the resulting outcome
is “good enough”. Achilles’ action seems clearly wrong, since he
could just as easily have saved a greater number of people from
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poverty, at no cost. Satiscing consequentialism thus seems at risk
of violating a maximally weakened variant of Singer (1972)’s sacri-
ce principle: If you can prevent something bad from happening,
without sacricing anything whatsoever, you ought, morally, to do
it!
Bradley (2006) extends the problem by presenting cases in
which satiscing consequentialism would seem to allow agents
to gratuitously obstruct an optimal outcome that would have oc-
curred without their malecent interference. But surely no conse-
quentialist should wish to license actions that so gratuitously steer
us away from better outcomes.
A natural response for satiscers is to insist that gratuitously
suboptimal outcomes fail to qualify as “good enough” in context
(Turri 2005). Rogers (2010) develops a complicated form of satis-
cing consequentialism that meets this desideratum by only per-
mitting suboptimal choices when the morally better alternatives
are comparatively costly to the agent. Chappell (2019) similarly
argues that the best structure for a satiscing theory to adopt is one
of constrained maximization, according to which (roughly speaking)
agents should do the best they can without suering undue burden.
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This makes clear that gratuitous suboptimality is never permitted.
And it yields a compelling account of supererogation as choosing
to surpass the demandingness-moderating constraints in order
to achieve even better results. On such an account, the key work
for a satiscing theory is to esh out what counts as acceptable
vs. undue burdens.
3.2 Arbitrariness
This leads us to what may be the most obvious challenge for satis-
cers, namely, identifying—on a principled basis—where to draw
the line for what counts as “good enough”. Is there any non-
arbitrary way to do this? As suggested in sec. 2, I think we can
best make progress here by clarifying what we have in mind when
asking which acts are good enough—good enough to secure what
status, exactly? Some form of minimal decency, presumably. But
as we saw, there are (at least) two ways of eshing out this idea: (i)
directly in terms of our overall reasons for action, or (ii) indirectly
in terms of warranting reactive attitudes.
If we understand minimal decency in terms of giving sucient
weight to moral reasons (in relation to the weight we give to our
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non-moral reasons), we need our complete theory of practical
reason to specify what those appropriate weightings are. Call this
the “rationalist” view of moral rightness. If there are such varieties
of reasons, there’s presumably a fact of the matter about their
comparative strengths or weights. Satiscers could then appeal to
such facts in order to determine, non-arbitrarily, what outcomes
are morally “good enough”. These outcomes are “good enough”
in the sense that any morally better alternatives are subject to
countervailing non-moral reasons that are suciently weighty as
to rationally justify the agent’s refusal to choose them.
Alternatively, on a “sentimentalist” understanding of minimal
decency in terms of (say) demonstrating sucient quality of will
as to render the agent blameless,9 we instead need an account of
blameworthiness (or the ttingness conditions for reactive atti-
tudes) to specify the minimum baseline for what counts as ade-
quate moral concern. Once we have such an account, Chappell
(2019, 256–57) argues that the satiscing consequentialist can co-
9This is a slight oversimplication. It should be possible to do the right thing
for the wrong reasons, after all, and hence act permissibly but in a way that is
blameworthy. So the connection must be slightly looser than presented above.
It would be better to understand permissible acts as those that are compatible
with possessing adequate quality of will, given all relevant information. But the
precise details aren’t essential for our purposes.
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opt it to provide a principled specication of how much eort
(or burden) morality can require of us. First we ask how much ef-
fort an agent in certain circumstances must be willing to expend
in pursuit of the general good in order to qualify as adequately
concerned (according to our independent account of quality of
will). Then we can claim that the agent is required to bring about
the best results they can without having to exceed that level of eort
(excessive gains being supererogatory).
Either way, the satiscer’s line between right and wrong can be
drawn in a principled way. It simply requires drawing upon re-
sources that go beyond the core consequentialist theory: appealing
to either non-moral practical reasons or else tting attitudes.
3.3 Options without constraints
Our nal challenge for satiscing consequentialism is more exten-
sional than structural. The worry is that it risks licensing morally
atrocious actions. It’s a familiar point that, given its rejection of
the doing/allowing distinction and associated deontic constraints,
traditional act consequentialism is apt to license actions that strike
many as intuitively wrong: killing one as a means to saving ve,
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for example. But at least themaximizer has a compelling response
available: such acts are necessary for bringing about the best avail-
able outcome. However bad it may be for one to die, it would
surely be worse for ve to do so.
The satiscing consequentialist has no such easy answer. Con-
sequentialism ascribes no essential signicance to the distinction
between doing and allowing, or between harming and failing to
benet. So if satiscing consequentialism sometimes permits us to
suboptimally let others die, it seems that it must equally permit us
to suboptimally murder (Mulgan 2001; cf. Kagan 1984, 251). This is
a serious problem for the view. After all, however intuitive it may
be to say that we are allowed to refrain from saving a life if that
would cost us thousands of dollars, that surely isn’t worth being
stuck with the corresponding verdict that it’s permissible to kill
someone merely for personal gain.
This problem may be especially pressing for the rationalist
satiscer, who is committed to their deontic verdicts tracking the
agent’s overall normative reasons. They may, of course, appeal
to typical consequentialist strategies for avoiding counterexam-
ples, e.g. noting the risk of worse outcomes if agents felt free to
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disregard deontic constraints. They might thus recommend that
agents adopt a decision procedure that disallows these objectively
justied actions. But the mere fact that their view holds subop-
timal killings to be objectively justied is arguably disqualifying,
regardless of whether they endorse or reject a decision procedure
that encourages agents to be guided by this normative fact.
The sentimentalist satiscer may be better placed to weaken
the force of the objection in a couple of ways. First, they can
note that their deontic verdict of permissibility doesn’t entail that
the agent has most overall reason to act in this way. It’s open to
sentimentalist satiscers to insist that agents always have most
reason to act optimally, such that suboptimal acts (even when
blameless) constitute a kind of mistake. So that’s something. But it
isn’t a very satisfying response, as we would ordinarily think that
killing someone for (comparativelymorally insignicant) personal
gain is a paradigm example of a blameworthy (and not merely
rationally imperfect) act.
A better route for the sentimentalist, I think, is to appeal to fea-
tures of human psychology that can explain why killing typically
reveals a worse quality of will thanmerely letting die. The relevant
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psychological facts concern what we nd salient. We do not gen-
erally nd the millions of potential beneciaries of charitable aid
to be highly salient. Indeed, people are dying all the time without
impinging upon our awareness at all. A killer, by contrast, is (in
any normal case) apt to be vividly aware of their victim’s death.
So killing tends to involve neglecting much more salient needs
than does merely letting die.10
Next, note that neglecting more salient needs reveals a greater
decit of good will (Chappell and Yetter-Chappell 2016, 452). This
is because any altruistic desires we may have will be more strongly
activated when others’ needs are more salient. So if our resulting
behavior remains non-altruistic even when others’ needs are most
salient, that suggests that any altruistic desires we may have are (at
best) extremely weak. Non-altruistic behavior in the face of less
salient needs, by contrast, is compatible with our nonetheless pos-
sessing altruistic desires of some modest strength—and possibly
sucient strength to qualify as “adequate” moral concern.
Putting these two facts together, then, secures us the result
10There are exceptions, e.g. watching a child drown in a shallow pond right
before your eyes—but those are precisely the cases in which we’re inclined to
judge letting die to be morally comparable to killing.
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that suboptimal killing is more apt to be blameworthy (and hence
impermissible in sentimentalist terms) than comparably subop-
timal instances of letting die. It’s a neat result for sentimentalist
satiscers that they’re able to secure this intuitive result without at-
tributing any fundamental normative signicance to the distinction
between killing and letting die.
4 Reconciliation
In the debate between maximizers, satiscers, and scalar conse-
quentialists, we’ve seen that much hinges on our understanding
of what any putative distinction between right and wrong is sup-
posed to signify. Given the various possibilities explored already
in this paper, we may wonder whether participants in this debate
have always had the same shared concept in mind. That is, we
might question whether there is any single determinate “ordinary
concept of rightness” for this debate to be about. If ordinary usage
vacillates or otherwise underdetermines what is really meant here,
the resulting “ordinary concept” may be too amorphous to make
sense of the present dispute. As we’ve seen, it’s especially unclear
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what maximizers have in mind with their “rightness” talk, and
whether there’s really any substantive disagreement to be found
between them and scalar consequentialists.
This diagnosis opens up an attractive new option for resolving
the debate in a more ecumenical fashion. We may become deontic
pluralists, accepting a variety of dierent deontic concepts (dier-
ent senses of right, ought, etc.), and see maximizers, satiscers, and
scalar consequentialists as oering complementary insights into
dierent parts of the moral landscape.
4.1 Deontic Monism
To clear the way for deontic pluralism, it will be helpful to assess
the rival view that there is a single, privileged sense of rightness.
Given the multiple possible ways of constructing deontic terms
that we’ve discussed already in this paper, the only clear basis I
can see for insisting upon deontic monism would be if one held
that there was a primitive, indenable sense of “right” and “wrong”,
which could take linguistic priority over the various denable
senses of these terms. Part (2011, 1:165) seems to arm such a
view, using the phrase “mustn’t-be-done” to express what he calls
27
an “indenable version of the concept wrong”.
I think there are good reasons for consequentialists to reject
such a view. To begin with, the idea of a primitive property
of mustn’t-be-done seems unacceptably mysterious, in contrast
to more familiar normative properties such as counting in favor
of an action, or rationally warranting some attitude. Absolutist
moral theories such as Kantianism might well make better sense
of such a property, so I don’t here mean to suggest that it is un-
acceptably mysterious in some theory-neutral sense that counts
against those other theories. I just mean that a primitive notion
of mustn’t-be-done seems mysterious specically in the context of
consequentialism. It seems like a bad t for the theory. It’s not the
kind of property that I’d expect consequentialists to comfortably
countenance.
Indeed, the arguments for scalar consequentialism make a lot
more sense if we take primitive rightness to be their target. The
arbitrariness objection returns in full force, since without an ana-
lytic connection to other normatively signicant properties, there
would seem no basis for drawing the line between right and wrong
at any particular point (maximal or otherwise) on the scale from
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better to worse acts. Perhaps connections could be restored by ac-
counting for other properties, such as blameworthiness, in terms
of primitive rightness. But this would at the very least raise tricky
methodological issues about the legitimacy of using the down-
stream property to x the location of the upstream one.
Moreover, insofar as I have any grip at all on the concept of
mustn’t-be-done, it seems like it should mark a point of signicant
discontinuity in the strength of one’s moral reasons to act, but this
is dicult to reconcile with the continuous scale of value that our
acts can realize. It also seems like bystanders should be specially
concerned to prevent the occurrence of acts that mustn’t be done.
But such claims are incompatible with consequentialism, as we
saw in sec. 2.
Finally, I think the attractiveness of the deontic pluralist pack-
age presented below gives us further reason to reject this (less




We may begin by arming that a scalar account of our moral
reasons constitutes the core of consequentialism. On this view, the
extent to which one has a moral reason to φ is purely a function
of how good the world would be if one were to φ.11 The better the
outcome, the more reason we have to produce it (Howard-Snyder
1994, 110).
Further, as we saw in sec. 4.1, scalar consequentialists correctly
reject primitive rightness. This is an important insight that (per-
haps surprisingly) clears the way for plausible forms of maximiz-
ing and satiscing consequentialism to emerge. For while we
should reject primitive or indenable deontic concepts, we may
supplement our core scalar viewwith various denable deontic con-
cepts, including ones that are dened in terms that are normatively
signicant rather than merely conventional.
First we may consider a couple of deontic concepts that are
denable in terms of our reasons for action. There’s an obvious
sense in which we (ideally) morally ought to do whatever we have
most moral reason to do. Maximizing consequentialism may be
11Thanks to Doug Portmore for suggesting this formulation.
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most comfortably understood as answering the question of what
we ought, in this aspirational sense, to do (Norcross 2019, chap.
2.9). There would seem no reason for any consequentialist to
deny the maximizer’s view, so understood. More interestingly,
some might arm the hegemonic thesis that this is also what
we have most overall reason to do (contra dual-rankers and others
who posit weighty non-moral reasons). Addressing what we have
most overall reason to do is, after all, much more substantive and
interesting thanmerely addressing some narrower class of “moral”
reasons that might yet be outweighed by other considerations. So
I would encourage serious consequentialists to defend this more
ambitious maximizing view.
Next, as we saw in secs. 3.2–3.3, there is a sentimentalist under-
standing of wrongness in terms of blameworthiness that meshes
very nicely with satiscing consequentialism. This allows con-
sequentialists to present a less demanding account of our obli-
gations, and also to account for the intuitive signicance of the
doing/allowing distinction in an appropriately derivative fashion.
Consequentialists may thus avail themselves of multiple deon-
tic concepts. But you may wonder whether all of them are really
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needed. Perhaps we can identify one that has normative priority
in virtue of its special relevance to rst-personal deliberation—i.e.,
as the sense of ‘ought’ that a conscientious agent has in mind when
they ask themselves, “What ought I to do?”
There are independent grounds for doubting that the delib-
erative question has a suitably xed and determinate meaning.12
Even just focusing on the choice between the ought of most reason
and the ought of minimal decency (or blamelessness), we aren’t
obviously forced in either direction here, e.g. by the constitutive
norms of agential deliberation. Some agents in some contexts are
particularly concerned to at least meet the standards for minimal
decency, whereas others are more morally ambitious. We can
certainly say that it’s better for agents to do better. But it isn’t clear
that there’s much more we can say beyond this trivial evaluative
observation. In particular, I see no clear basis for insisting that
there is just one proper aim of deliberation.
On the contrary, I think we can make good sense of why both
standards have a limited place in our normative lives. The ought
12See https://www.philosophyetc.net/2009/06/deliberative-question.html
for discussion of how the relativistic aspects of our assertoric practices here
undermine the philosophical signicance of the deliberative question.
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of most reason is perhaps the most obviously signicant. It picks
out the best choice for us to make, the option which is most well-
justied, providing an ideal standard to which it makes sense to
aspire. (Of course, whether it is practically useful or advisable to
aspire to it in any given situation is a further, empirical question.
Some may just be disheartened were they to try. But I don’t take
such practical concerns to undermine the in-principle aptness of
the aspiration, which is what I’m concerned with here.)
The practical relevance of the ought of minimal decency
may be supported in two ways. First, it arguably has more
third-personal signicance. We properly hold others to account
when their actions fall below the baseline of minimal decency
and into the realm of the blameworthy. Although it’s nice when
they do better than the minimum required, we typically don’t
feel that it’s our place to probe too deeply into such matters, or
to evaluate them too closely. (“How much exactly did you give to
charity last year?”)
Secondly, the baseline of minimal decency may have rst-
personal signicance given our nature as awed agents who regu-
larly (perhaps even inevitably) do less than the absolute best. Given
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that we must, practically speaking, make our peace with often fail-
ing to meet the ideal standard, it would seem helpful to have a
“backup” standard below which we feel we must not fall. The ought
of minimal decency seems a natural t for this role. (Again, I don’t
mean that it is necessarily the empirically most useful guide for
us to follow, but just that it makes theoretical sense as a principled
basis for ruling out some options as “unacceptably bad” without
committing ourselves to acting perfectly.)
All three components of our deontic-pluralist consequentialist
package thus strike me as important for an apt moral outlook. It
makes sense to aspire to do the best, while recognizing and accept-
ing the reality that, as awed agents, we will typically fall short.
And it makes sense to have a rmer commitment to maintaining
a level of at least minimal decency, rather than being willing to
plummet to any moral depths without limit. Then, between these
two principled standards lies a continuous scale of more-or-less
demanding standards that we might choose to target. To help
guide us in this choice, we can appreciate that the more good we
achieve, the better. But beyond that, there is no authoritativemeta-
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standard out there to tell us how high to aim.13 This observation
may be taken to reinforce the scalar “core” of the pluralist view
I’ve defended.
We’ve seen that deontic pluralism provides consequentialists
with the opportunity to accept an attractive package of views:
scalar at core, maximizing about the ought of most reason, and
satiscing about obligation. Notably, these specic scalar, max-
imizing, and satiscing claims do not conict. Moreover, each
seems to have a place in our thinking about the normative ter-
rain. So we can, and arguably should, accept all three. Our overall
consequentialist theory may be the stronger for it.
13Though some consequentialists may naturally be drawn to the practical
meta-standard of asking what standard is such that our aiming at it would have the
best consequences? That’s of some practical interest, but lacks the special authority
of identifying the uniquely tting or appropriate standard to aim at. It is also,
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